Title: “Analyzing the effects of contract and structural design in health care supply chains”
- In a vertically integrated system, how do access (i.e., which patients are eligible to be prescribed, and reimbursed for, a new drug) and service (i.e., how much capacity is built/how many drugs are purchased, in order to meet patient demand) levels interact as a function of the system’s priorities (i.e., social welfare vs. net utility maximizer) and constraints (i.e., absolute budget limits and cost-effectiveness restrictions)?
- In a manufacturer-health payer system, what changes as the selling price is exogenously (vs. endogenously) set, and the manufacturer is (vs. isn’t) willing to share some of the risks associated with demand and health outcomes?
- How does the decision of segmenting vs. consolidating the design/distribution channel for a drug with multiple therapeutic indications reflect on the service level and the incentives for innovation effort?
- What is the effect of all the above on: pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profits, health-payer’s expenditures, and patient welfare?